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Abstract: Nitrate discharges from diffuse agricultural sources significantly contribute to 
groundwater and surface water pollution. Tradable permit programs have been proposed as a 
means of controlling nitrate emissions efficiently, but trading is complicated by the dispersed and 
delayed effects of the diffuse pollution. Hence, markets in nitrate discharge permits should be 
carefully designed to account for the underlying spatial and temporal interactions. Nitrate permit 
markets can be designed similar to the modern electricity markets which use LPs to find the 
equilibrium prices because the two trading problems have close analogy. 
In this paper, we propose alternative LP models to find efficient permit prices for year-ahead 
markets. The model structure varies depending on the catchment hydro-geology and long-term 
goals of the community. We show how the market price structures are driven by the constraint 
structure under different environmental conditions. We discuss the physical and economic 
conditions required to assure consistent prices, the modeling of essential and optional constraints 
in an LP, and the problem of balancing resource allocation over time among delayed-response 
discharge units. We then extend the LP model to balance resource allocation over time and to 
improve the market performance. 
Keywords: water quality markets, nitrate trading, non-point sources, tradable 
permits, linear programming. 
1 Introduction 
Nitrate is a critical water pollutant. High nitrate concentration in drinking water 
can cause illness including blue baby syndrome in infants (Wiederholt and 
Johnson 2005). Excess nitrates in surface water promote growth of algae and 
other nuisance weeds. Excess nitrate discharge into oceans contributes to dead 
zones (Alexander et al. 2008). 
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Agriculture is the number one source of nitrate in almost all threatened water 
resources (OCED 2008; Ongley 1999). Unlike most water pollutants that are 
carried down to water bodies via storm water runoff, nitrate loss to the 
environment occurs mainly due to leaching from soil layers. Intensive application 
of nitrogen fertilizer and livestock effluent on agricultural land leaves a surplus of 
nitrogen in the soil. The surplus leaches into the underlying aquifers as nitrate. 
Nitrate1
First, a trading system should account for the time lags between leaching and 
appearance in a water body. Nitrate, once mixed in slow-moving groundwater, 
can flow with groundwater for decades until being discharged into a surface water 
body or the ocean. The time lags vary depending on the location of loading and 
the hydro-geology of the flow paths. 
 is quite stable in water and flows with groundwater towards surface water 
sinks. In surface water, nitrate may be taken up by aquatic plants, subjected to 
chemical transformations, or carried down to the oceans. Tradable discharge 
permit programs have been proposed as a means of balancing the demand for 
nitrate intensive farming and the capacity of the natural water bodies to dilute 
nitrates (Leston 1992; Ribaudo et al. 1999; Faeth 2000). However, trading nitrate 
discharge permits is difficult and complicated due to the spatial and temporal 
impacts of diffuse agricultural sources. The physics of nitrate movement suggests 
four main factors need to be considered in trading these permits. 
Second, nitrate in groundwater may be transformed into other forms of nitrogen 
by chemical reactions such as pyrite oxidation (Conan et al. 2000) and by 
biological denitrification). The amount of attenuation depends on the properties of 
the subsurface strata and the flow paths. Hence, a trading system should consider 
attenuation in transport. 
Third, the quantity of nitrate transported from a farm to some surface water body 
is not delivered in one step, but gradually over a relatively long period. Therefore, 
permit exchanges should take into account the protracted delivery profiles.  
Fourth, a trading system must be capable of handling many distinct receptors (a 
water body or a point on a water body where water quality is monitored). Since 
monitoring nitrate everywhere is impractical, catchment planners usually select a 
                                                 
1 Nitrate is the most common form of nitrogen found in water as a pollutant. But, nitrogen may 
found in water in other forms as ammonium. 
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few receptors that indicate the overall water quality in the catchment. The farms in 
a catchment may affect different receptors over different time scales. 
Due to the above reasons, trades in nitrate discharge permits need to satisfy 
several spatial and temporal environmental constraints simultaneously. Other 
regional, political, and private constraints may add further complications. When 
several constraints are involved, bilateral trade in emission permits cannot achieve 
the efficient allocation of permits. Therefore, a centrally controlled, multilateral 
trading framework is required (Ermoliev et al. 2000). 
Most of the existing trading programs and the conceptual market models proposed 
to date are simplified versions of the real problem (US EPA 2007; NIWA 2009). 
For example, Lock and Kerr (2008) designed a market for New Zealand’s Lake 
Rotorua catchment, assuming that all nitrogen lost from farms would reach the 
lake, which is the only receptor considered, after some specific number of years. 
In this case, only time lags are taken into account, ignoring attenuation, protracted 
delivery, and other receptors. Another market model proposed by Morgan et al. 
(2000) for trading infinitely valid permits considers a single receptor (a selected 
groundwater well) and a single time period (the last year of the planning horizon). 
Such systems are unable to assure water quality over time. The common pitfall in 
all those proposed trading programs is that they ignore some important constraints 
to simplify the problem. 
To achieve environmental feasibility, nitrate discharge permits are usually traded 
in year-ahead (ex-ante) markets, requiring market operators to find the 
equilibrium prices ex-ante. A marginal cost based pricing scheme is required to 
assure efficient resource allocation. Unless all the relevant constraints are imposed 
on the market, the prices will not reflect the true marginal costs and will lead to 
inefficient allocations. The problem is how to find a set of optimal prices which 
ration the permits relative to each farm’s profit/cost function while satisfying all 
the environmental and other constraints. Ermoliev et al. (2000) proposed that a 
market coordinator who acts as a Walrasian auctioneer could lead a centrally 
controlled permit market towards a set of equilibrium ambient2
                                                 
2 An ambient price is a price for increasing the nitrate level at a specific receptor (McGartland 
1988; Ermoliev et al. 2000). 
 and discharge 
prices. The auctioneer announces a set of ambient prices, and a set of discharge 
prices derived from the ambient prices, and lets the dischargers submit the 
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quantities they would like to trade at the announced prices. The process can be 
continued by adjusting the prices, until equilibrium is achieved. However, the 
auction may not reach equilibrium quickly or monotonically. The authors 
themselves accepted that the process may take a long time. 
To find the equilibrium prices, a Walrasian auction is not required if the 
dischargers provide the coordinator information on quantities they would trade at 
each possible price step, beforehand. The optimal allocation may be modelled as a 
mathematical program, often a linear program (LP), from which the equilibrium 
prices may be obtained straight off. This is the lesson that the environmental 
policy makers could learn from the modern electricity markets, which use LPs to 
clear the markets and set the prices instantaneously (Alvey et al. 1998; Hogan et 
al. 1999). The similarity is that both are common pool multilateral trading 
problems with complex interactions and constraints. If the gains from trade, and 
constraints on trade, can be modelled linearly, the two problems have close 
analogy. An added benefit is that not only the environmental constraints, but all 
relevant political, regional, and individual constraints could be included in the 
pricing models, if justified by the stake holders. 
Due to the underlying spatial and temporal complexities, modelling a market in 
nitrate discharge permits is quite complicated. General (air and water) pollution 
permit market models discussed in the literature, for example, McGartland (1988), 
are not applicable, mainly because they are single period models. Our contribution 
is to present appropriate LP models for pricing nitrate discharge permits. We first 
discuss how a market in nitrate discharge permits could be designed and operated 
using an LP which models the market ex-ante, and produces the optimal 
allocations and prices. Then we discuss the information required in formulating an 
LP to price the permits and the physical and economic conditions required to 
justify a linear model. We present a base case LP which models the essentials of a 
nitrate permit market. Then we discuss different types of applicable constraints, 
how to model them in the market-clearing LP, and how they affect market prices. 
Next, we discuss the problem of balancing resource allocation over time, a 
problem which is specific to the delayed-response pollution permit allocations. 
We present an extended LP model, which have the ability to balance resource 
allocations over time and to reduce the risk of under-pricing resources. We 
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demonstrate the concepts with a conceptual market model for a hypothetical lake 
catchment. 
2 A Market in Nitrate Discharge Permits 
Environmental permit markets need precise definitions of the commodities being 
traded. In a market for nitrate discharge permits, the maximum acceptable nitrate 
level (sustainable nitrate intake capacity) of each receptor in each time period is a 
traded resource. A “resource permit” is a right to increase the nitrate level at a 
specified receptor in a specified time period3
2.1 Market Design and Operation 
.  But nitrate discharge at a particular 
time and place will increase nitrate levels at one or more receptors over many 
periods. Thus, if only these resource permits were traded, each farm would have 
to assemble a whole portfolio of resource permits to match their discharge in any 
year. To enable farms to buy a single discharge permit rather than multiple 
resource permits, we define nitrate “loading permits” as rights to load a specified 
amount of nitrate into the aquifer underlying the farms, in a given year. A loading 
permit is equivalent to a bundle of resource permits. The trading system is 
designed so that farms can buy and sell loading permits in the same exchange 
market, even though those permits are not directly comparable between farms. 
To facilitate trade in nitrate loading permits, we propose a centrally mediated 
multilateral trading system similar to the New Zealand electricity market (Alvey 
et al. 1998). The dominant feature is the use of an LP which optimizes the trading 
of  permits between participants,  and determines equilibrium prices, so as to 
maximize the benefits of trade, as defined by the offers and bids submitted by 
market participants. Such a trading system is best implemented as an online 
trading system (although this is not a requirement) so that the farms can trade 
multilaterally in a virtual market place. An electronic market such as this, 
supported by optimization methodology, is often known as a “smart market” 
(McCabe et al. 1991). 
                                                 
3 The resource permits are synonymous to the ambient permits discussed in the literature 
(McGartland 1988; Ermoliev et al. 2000) with one key difference: Conventional ambient permits 
are not time specific, but the resource permits discussed in this work are rights to pollute a receptor 
in a specified time period.  
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The market is designed at the catchment scale. Farms in the catchment can buy 
and sell loading permits. Each permit is valid for a single year, but the farms can 
simultaneously trade permits for a fixed number of upcoming years. Hence, this is 
a market in short term property leases rather than a market in long-term property 
“ownership” rights; the permits traded are similar to lease contracts. We assume 
that the government (regulator) retains “ownership” of, or at least control of and 
responsibility for the environment and its ability to assimilate pollutants, on behalf 
of the public. Any long-term discharge rights held by farms may be considered as 
initial holdings. 
The market operates as a periodic auction. At the beginning of every trading year, 
the market operator calls for bids from the farms. The bids provide input data for 
the market clearing LP. The LP solution gives the optimal permit position and 
price for each farm. The market operator then calculates the net trades from the 
initial (pre-trade) and optimal (ex-post) permit positions. Then the operator 
collects money from net buyers, pays net sellers, and settles the market. For 
simplicity, we will assume that all payments are settled immediately. Some trial 
market rounds would provide a price discovery process, during which farms 
would adjust their bids and offers to market conditions, as in the electricity 
market. 
2.2 Scope of the Trading System 
The scope of the trading system is determined by the set of receptors considered 
and the planning horizon selected. The receptors and what is controlled at the 
receptors (whether nitrate mass or concentration) should be well defined. 
A catchment, by definition, is a land area from which water drains towards a 
common water body. Therefore, any catchment-scale water pollution trading 
system should consider the common sink, towards which the catchment drains, as 
the main receptor. A catchment may have many sub-catchments draining to 
intermediate connected streams or lakes, which may also be considered as 
receptors to avoid excessive local pollution. The nitrate concentration in surface 
water may not be a good indicator of diffuse discharges, because the concentration 
is affected by surface water flow, which is more variable and uncertain than 
groundwater flow. But groundwater monitoring wells may be considered as 
7 
receptors, where the nitrate concentration is to be controlled, rather than the mass 
nitrate discharge. 
Nitrate loading in any period affects the receptors in many future periods. Hence, 
the market model should constrain those future impacts, ideally, for as long as the 
impacts extend. The planning horizon should therefore be at least the catchment’s 
maximum nitrate travel time (residence time). Hydrologists usually estimate the 
maximum residence time as a tail percentile, such as 99th or 95th.
2.3 Information and Assumptions 
, of the fraction of 
nitrate delivered from a given discharge. Large groundwater catchments can have 
long residence times, for example, 200 years in the Lake Rotorua catchment of 
New Zealand (Lock and Kerr 2008). Therefore, the associated market models can 
require long planning horizons. 
2.3.1 Farm Profit Functions 
Modeling the optimal distribution of nitrate loading requires knowledge of how 
much profit each farm can make from each unit of discharge permit allocated4. 
For both market-based and non-market based pollution management problems, 
this is the most difficult and vital information required. Following the convention 
in electricity markets, this trading system expects the farms to submit bids 
indicating the price they would pay (or accept) for each incremental block of 
quantity, starting from zero5. A rational farm would buy another X units of 
loading permits if the incremental profit from each unit is above the price, and 
therefore bid to buy at the marginal profit6
                                                 
4 Markets in pollution permits are usually modelled to minimise abatement cost rather than to 
maximise profit (Montgomery 1972; McGartland 1988; Ermoliev et al. 2000). However, allocation 
of diffuse nitrate discharge permits is a problem of optimising the allocation of land uses rather 
than the abatement responsibilities. In the case of nitrate loading permits, forgone profit from a 
more nitrate intensive farming option may be considered as an abatement cost. Therefore, 
maximising profit is the same as minimising abatement cost. 
. Thus, the bids indicating the 
additional quantity preferred at each price step correspond to a piece-wise linear 
profit function of the farm. We will not use time discounts in the market clearing 
5 A market which requires the participants to bid for quantities starting from zero is called a “gross 
pool” market. Alternatively, the market may operate as a “net pool” which allows the participants 
to submit both bids and offers. Net pool bids and offers can easily be transformed into gross pool 
bids and vice-versa if the initial position is known.  
6 If the market is not perfectly competitive, the buyers and sellers could game the bids above or 
below the marginal profit to affect market prices. However, a catchment usually has a relatively 
large number of farms, and a catchment scale market is expected to be workably competitive. 
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model, relying on the farms to discount their bids at their own rates, taking 
account of when settlements will be due for payment. If settlement is immediate, 
bids for future permits will thus indicate the discounted present value of future 
permits. 
All the farms in a catchment are assumed to be participating in the trading system. 
The farms that do not actually participate in the market by submitting bids are 
assigned two default bid tranches: one with a price of infinity (a relatively large 
price) and a quantity equal to the initial position, and the other with a negative 
price. These two default bids indicate that the farm does not wish to either buy or 
sell. 
To optimize the bids, the farms need to know the profits and nitrate loadings of 
each available land use option. A land use option is a combination of factors such 
as the type of crop grown, type of stock, fertilizer application rate, stocking 
density, irrigation method, effluent discharge system, drain layout, and other land 
management practices. The size of the permit required to adopt some land use 
option is the estimated nitrate leaching from that land use option. 
To estimate the potential nitrate leaching from possible land uses, and thus the 
size of the permit required to cover their operations in each year, the farms can 
use a soil nitrogen model. Standard soil models such as SWAT (Neitsch et al. 
2005), or regionalized nutrient budget models such as OVERSEER (used in New 
Zealand) simulate soil nitrogen dynamics (crop uptake, mineralization, 
immobilization, nitrification, de-nitrification) and estimate the nitrate leaching. If 
the farms do not have access to such models, the authorities could provide 
information about leaching from possible land use options and their permit 
requirements. The models used to estimate leaching could possibly be authorized 
by the market authorities, although that would raise accountability and liability 
issues, if the model were subsequently revised. 
Farms also need to know the potential profit from alternative land uses. Farm 
economic models such as WFM (Beukes 2005) can estimate the potential profits 
from different land use and management options. Rather than independent agro-
ecological and agro-economic models, integrated agro-ecological and agro-
economic models which can predict both the nitrate losses and potential profits 
from alternative land uses (Johnson, 1991; Mohamed et al., 2000) would better 
help the farms in optimizing their bids. But, the assessment of potential profit is a 
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private matter and the farms will have to be responsible for their own judgments 
irrespective of the model used. 
2.3.2 Linkage between the Sources and Receptors 
The ultimate goal of permit trading is to maintain sustainable nitrate levels at all 
the receptors throughout the planning horizon at least cost to society. To achieve 
this, the regulators divide the planning horizon into discrete time intervals, and 
impose water quality standards based on maximum acceptable nitrate mass or 
concentration in each time interval. The time intervals should be short enough to 
ensure that water quality is met continuously and long enough to avoid a large 
number of redundant constraints and computational difficulties. Taking into 
account the likely long planning horizons and long term resource commitments 
involved in commercial farming, we suggest imposing water quality constraints at 
yearly time intervals. 
To enforce water quality standards, the relationship between nitrate loading from 
the farms and the nitrate level at the receptors should be known. Following 
previous work on optimal management of nitrate loading, such as Morgan & 
Everett (2005), we assume a linear relationship between the loading and the 
increase in nitrate level at each receptor in each time step. By assuming linearity, 
we can calculate the increase in nitrate mass or concentration caused by each 
source at each receptor, in each time step after the loading occurs, as the product 
of the source loading and the relevant transport coefficient. Transport coefficients 
measure the increase in mass nitrate discharge or concentration at each receptor 
after each year’s delay due to one kg nitrate loading from each diffuse source 
(farm) during a single year.  
An important requirement for the above formulation is that the diffuse sources 
have a constant impact on the groundwater flow velocities (Gorelick and Remson 
1982). It is generally accepted that, in a steady state groundwater flow regime, 
mass nitrate discharge to a surface water body from its catchment, and nitrate 
concentration in groundwater discharge from a catchment have strong linear 
relationships with nitrate loading in the catchment (Rao et al. 2009). Transport 
coefficients can be estimated using a catchment nitrate transport model. 
Commonly available computer codes such as MT3D (Zheng 1990) are suitable to 
simulate nitrate transport and to estimate the transport coefficients. 
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2.3.3 Non-tradable sources 
A catchment may have many sources of nitrate other than agriculture, for 
example, storm water and direct dischargers such as sewage works. Direct 
dischargers, usually known as point sources, may be included in the trading 
scheme, as discussed in Prabodanie et al. (2009). However, unmanageable sources 
such as nitrates loaded into the groundwater system from prior land use and 
currently flowing towards some surface water sink should be considered as non-
tradable sources. The market authorities should calculate tradable resource 
capacities after providing allowances for pre-estimated non-tradable source 
resource commitments. As the effects of non-tradable sources change over time, 
the tradable capacities should be calculated again every time trading takes place, 
taking into account previous nitrate discharges, including the previous year’s 
tradable discharges. The market authorities can use catchment nitrate transport 
models and other regional environmental models to estimate the non-tradable 
source contributions. Again, the tradable capacity estimates may not be perfect, 
and liability for the consequences of mis-estimation would be an issue to be 
resolved for market implementation. 
2.4 Monitoring and Enforcement 
Once the market is cleared for some trading year, all the participants should 
comply with the cleared permit positions until the next auction. The government, 
through a regional environmental authority, should oversee the trading system and 
enforce the loading limits specified by the permits. Monitoring devices may be 
located in the farms to measure the nitrate concentration in the leachate and thus 
the actual loading. However, it is not possible to measure the actual loading from 
the farms during a year with 100% accuracy. Since the amount of nitrate loading 
is determined by the type of land use, instead of monitoring the quantitative 
loading, the environmental authorities may restrict the farms to the land use 
practices allowed by the size of the loading permit held. Better monitoring may be 
achieved via a combination of the above two monitoring methods. 
Market rules must specify whether the participants should be deemed to have 
purchased permits for the agreed discharge rate, or instead for the activity level 
that, according to the model, was expected to produce that discharge rate. Who 
bears liability for wrong estimates must be resolved before a trading system is 
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implemented. Such pragmatic and political issues are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
3 Market Clearing LP - Optimal Loading Model 
Conventionally, the pollution permit allocation problem is modelled for a single 
time period to allocate emission rights so that the environmental quality standards 
at the selected receptors are met at the least cost to society. But a market in diffuse 
nitrate discharge permits is complicated by the dispersed and delayed responses of 
diffuse discharges. In this section, we present a basic LP which models the 
essentials of a market in diffuse nitrate discharge permits, to serve as foundation 
for more general models. 
Indices and Parameters: 
f = farm: 1,…, F. 
r = receptor: 1,…, R. 
d = delay in years: 0,…, D. D = maximum nitrate residence time in the catchment. 
s = permit year: 1,…, S. S = last year (also the number of years) for which permits 
are traded. 
t = monitoring year: 1,…, S+D. 
The upcoming year is given by s = t = 1. Rather than expressing s and t relative to 
the upcoming year, we may express them in terms of the absolute year, for 
example, as 2010,…, 2014. If the upcoming year is Ŝ, s= permit year: Ŝ,…, Ŝ+S–1 
and t = monitoring year: Ŝ,…, Ŝ+S–1+D. 
k = bid tranche: 1,…, K. 
Hfrd
C
 = increase in nitrate level that occurs at receptor r, d years after unit (1 kg) 
nitrate loading in farm f during a single year (kg or mg/l). 
rt
The quantity available for trading is calculated after providing allowances for all 
non-tradable source contributions. Hence, C
 = tradable nitrate intake capacity of receptor r in year t (kg or mg/l). 
rt = the maximum acceptable nitrate 
mass or concentration at receptor r in year t minus the nitrate level at receptor r in 
year t caused by all non-tradable sources. By defining a term for each resource 
(commodity) traded as “resourcert”, Crt can be given as the tradable capacity of 
resourcert
U
. 
fsk = size (quantity) of bid tranche k submitted by farm f for year-s permits (kg). 
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Pfsk
Decision variables: 
= price specified in bid tranche k submitted by farm f for year-s permits ($/kg). 
xfsk
q
 = quantity accepted from bid tranche k submitted by farm f for year-s loading 
permits (kg). 
fs
Optimal Loading Model (OLM): 
 = size of the loading permit, for year s, held by farm f after trade; this is the 
maximum loading allowed for farm f during year s (kg). 
Maximize ∑f∑s∑k Pfskxfsk
Upper and lower bounds on bid tranches 
, subject to: 
xfsk ≤ Ufsk for all f, s, and k.    (P-1) θ+
−x
fsk 
fsk ≤ 0 for all f, s, and k.    (P-2) θ−
Calculation of individual allocations 
fsk 
∑kxfsk − qfs = 0 for all f and s.     (P-3)
 μ
Environmental constraints 
fs 
≤∑ ∑ −= − fsf
St
Dts stfr
qH),min(
),1max( )(
Crt for all r and t.   (P-4) λ
The above LP maximises the joint total profit to farms subject to maximum 
acceptable nitrate level in water over time and space. The LP is formulated as a 
“gross pool” market, which is independent of the initial distribution of permits. 
The bids reflect the additional quantity preferred at each price step if there were 
no initial holdings. Once the LP is solved and the optimal quantities and prices are 
found, the net buyers and sellers are determined by the difference between the 
final position and the initial position. Those who have added to the initial position 
are net buyers and those who have reduced in the initial position are net sellers; 
the payments and receipts due are calculated from the net trades. 
rt 
The objective function coefficients Pfsk indicate how much each block of nitrate 
loading is worth to the bidder. Hence, the objective function maximizes the total 
gains from trade. If the bids indicate the true economic contributions of the farms, 
the objective function also maximizes the true social welfare. The quantity 
accepted in each bid tranche cannot be negative (P-2); an upper bound on each bid 
tranche (P-1) ensures that the quantity cleared does not exceed the maximum 
specified by the bidder. The allocation constraints (P-3) specify the relationships 
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between quantities accepted and the final permit positions. The environmental 
constraints (P-4) require the market to meet the maximum acceptable nitrate level 
at each receptor in each time period. These “spatiotemporal” environmental 
constraints are considered as the set of capacity constraints in the market, because 
they restrict the tradable resource capacities. The capacity made available to the 
market (the right hand side of each capacity constraint) may be set below the 
currently available capacity Crt
The variables listed to the right of the constraints are the associated shadow 
prices. The dual formulation of the problem provides insight into the commodity 
prices that match the demand and supply. 
 to reserve some resources for future allocation. 
The problem of balancing resource allocation between the present and the future 
is discussed in Section 4.5. 
3.1 Dual Formulation and Market Prices 
While the OLM models the resource allocation problem, the “dual” of the OLM 
models the resource valuation problem. 
Minimise ∑f∑s∑kUfskθ+fsk + ∑r∑tCrtλrt
θ
, subject to: 
+
fsk − θ−fsk + μfs = Pfsk for all f, s, and k.   (D-1) x
−μ
fsk 
fs ∑ ∑ += −r rt
Ds
st stfr
H λ)( + = 0 for all f, and s.    (D-2) q
μ
fs 
fs
λ
 free for all f. 
rt
θ
 ≥ 0 for all r and t.  
+
fsk and θ−fsk
The shadow price λ
 ≥ 0 for all f, s, and k. 
rt of the capacity constraint (P-4) for some r and t, indicates 
how much the objective function would increase if the nitrate intake capacity of 
receptor r in time period t were increased by one unit. Farms would make an 
incremental profit of λrt if they were allowed to violate the capacity constraint by 
one unit. To stop the farms exceeding the limit, they should be charged at λrt per 
unit increase in nitrate mass or concentration at receptor r in period t. If the bids 
indicate the true marginal profit functions, λrt is a true marginal cost based price 
which results in efficient allocation of the resources. We call λrt a “resource 
price,” the market price which matches the demand and supply for resourcert
.)(∑ ∑ += −r rt
Ds
st stfr
H λ
. 
Since a loading permit is equivalent to a bundle of resource permits, the price of a 
loading permit for any farm can be derived from the prices of the resources in the 
bundle as  
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Demand for the resources varies depending on farm locations and characteristics. 
If most farms are far upstream with long delay times, their discharge may imply a 
heavy burden on constrained resources in later years, particularly if the farms have 
already been operating in an unconstrained way for some time. Hence the 
(undiscounted) price for the constrained resource capacity of later years may be 
greater than for earlier years. 
Even if the ability of a receptor to accept nitrate is constant over time (e.g., 400 
tonnes per year), the tradable capacities and thus the associated resource prices 
may vary over time due to the temporal variations in non-tradable sources. For 
example, a huge plume of nitrate already in the aquifer may be flowing towards 
the receptor and expected to reach the receptor after another 20 years. Then the 
tradable resource capacities of the years after the 20th (Cr21, Cr22
The shadow price μ
, … ) will be 
lower and the associated resource prices are likely to be higher. 
fs of the allocation constraint (P-3) indicates how much the 
objective function would increase if farm f were given another kg of year-s 
permits. Unlike the receptor prices (λrt) which describe the market equilibrium in 
receptor permits, μfs
Thus, the OLM formulation above does not always provide locational prices 
which can be charged to the farms directly. A true locational price for nitrate 
loading should describe the social marginal cost of nitrate loading from the 
particular location, irrespective of which entities are operating in that location. 
And they should be consistent for all farms in a similar location. To obtain such 
market clearing prices, we have to separate the locational effects of nitrate loading 
and the effects of participants’ private characteristics. A simplified market model 
could be developed by dividing the catchment area into a set of locations or zones, 
in which all farms are assumed to have the same transport coefficients. 
 is indexed to a particular farm, and may be called the 
“participant price”. Since each farm has a specific location in the catchment, the 
participant prices are similar to the “nodal” or locational prices used in electricity 
markets. For this simple formulation, these prices could be described as “market 
clearing prices”. But they have not been derived from strictly locational demand 
and supply balance constraints and, as discussed in Section 4.3, they may be 
affected by private constraints. 
Let z = 1,…, Z index the zone and let Hzrd be the zonal transport coefficient which 
measures the increase in nitrate level at receptor r, d years after 1 kg nitrate 
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loading in zone z during a single year (kg or mg/l). Let qzonezs
∑
 be the total loading 
from zone z (kg). The set of zonal loading variables would add another set of 
constraints to the OLM and change the  environmental constraints as follows. 
f∈z qfs − qzonezs = 0   for all z and s.   (P-5) β
rtzs
zone
z
St
Dts stzr
CqH ≤∑ ∑ −= −
),min(
),1max( )(
zs 
 for all r and t.   (P-6) λ
The new primal variables create a new set of dual constraints (D-4). The new 
primal constraint creates a new dual variable, β
rt 
zs, and change the dual constraint 
associated with primal variable qfs
−μ
 (D-2) to (D-3). 
fs + βzs= 0 for all f and s.      (D-3) q
− β
fs 
zs ∑ ∑ += −r rt
Ds
st stzr
H λ)( + = 0  for all z and s.   (D-4) q
zone
The shadow price β
zs 
zs of the constraint (P-5), which defines qzonezs, for some z and 
s, indicates how much the objective function would increase if another 1 kg of 
year-s loading permits were assigned to zone z. This is the social marginal cost of 
nitrate loading from zone z in year s. We call βzs the “zonal loading price”. Unlike 
the participant price, the zonal loading price is a locational price which is not 
indexed to a particular participant, and it does not vary among individual farms in 
the same zone based on any private constraint (or other side constraint) which 
applies to qfs. Since the zonal loading price is a market price determined by the 
zonal demand and supply, it can be directly charged to each farm in zone z.  The 
dual constraint associated with qzonezs
3.4 Settlement 
 (D-4) indicates that the zonal loading price 
equals the value of the bundle of resource permits equivalent to a unit (1 kg) 
loading permit allocated to zone z. The advantage of such a simplification is that 
all farms in a zone can readily verify that they have been treated fairly by the 
market and, in fact could trade permits between themselves without reference 
back to the wider market.   
Let Q*fs be the initial year-s permit position of farm f, kg. Then, the payment due 
from (to) farm f for buying (selling) year-s permits is βz(f),s×(qfs − Q*fs
Let Ω = ∑
), where z(f) 
is the zone to which farm f belongs. 
f∑s βz(f),s×(qfs − Q*fs) be the market operator’s net revenue after clearing 
the payments for the farms. If the initial distribution of permits is feasible, Ω is 
non-negative. If the farms do not possess any previously purchased permits, Ω is 
the total payment made by the farms for buying resources (or leasing contracts) 
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from the regulator. Then, Ω is the total lease payment due to the regulator. If the 
farms currently possess loading permits, and if the initial distribution of loading 
permits fully allocates all the resources (i.e., if the initial allocation binds all the 
capacity constraints), Ω is zero. The market re-allocation being bound by a 
capacity constraint which was not binding for the initial allocation means that the 
farms have bought resources from the regulator, and Ω will be non-zero. If the 
initial allocation was infeasible, Ω may be negative, as the regulator has to buy 
back the over-allocated resources. Such payments will offset one another if some 
resources were previously over-allocated, and some under-allocated. 
The regulator may choose to re-distribute the total revenue or a portion of the 
revenue among the market participants, based on some free initial allocation 
criteria. It may be better to redistribute the total revenue among the farms by 
making the free initial allocation in terms of resource permits rather than loading 
permits (because it is difficult to find a fair allocation of initial loading permits 
which also binds all the ex-post binding capacity constraints). 
3.5 Gains from Trade 
The shadow price θ+fsk of the bid upper bound constraint (P-1) indicates the 
increase in economic benefit if farm f were able to utilize another 1 kg at a 
marginal value of Pfsk.  If the kth bid of farm f corresponds to some land use 
option, then θ+fsk is the net gain from expanding that land use (in terms of 
fertilizer application rate, area cultivated, stocking density, etc.) by enough to 
cause another 1 kg of nitrate loading. Hence, the bid will be fully accepted if 
θ+fsk=Pfsk -μfs > 0. The shadow price θ−fsk of bid lower bound constraint (P-2) 
indicates the loss in economic benefit if one unit were to be accepted from that 
bid. Hence, the bid will not accepted if θ−fsk = μfs.- Pfsk > 0. Bids will be partially 
accepted if Pfsk =μfs, in which case θ−fsk= θ+fsk =0.Figure 1 highlights how these 
dual variables relate to the gains from trade. For example, if the initial position of 
farm f is zero, then f is a buyer of year-s permits, and the buyer surplus is ∑k∑xfsk 
θ+fsk. If the initial position of farm f is ∑kUfsk, then f is a seller of year-s permits, 
and the seller surplus is ∑k∑xfsk θ−fsk Hence the market allocation always satisfies 
the participant preferences indicated in the bids. 
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Fig 1: Buyer and seller surplus relative to the participant price. 
4 Model Generalization 
In the above discussion, the only commodity traded is the ability of the receptors 
to accept pollution. Hence, the receptor capacity constraints are the only supply-
side constraints. The “private” constraints faced by particular participants are 
assumed to be internalized into the bids, and no other demand-side constraints are 
imposed. If other constraints are required, the price structure becomes a little more 
complex, and we see particular participants facing new prices.  As a result, the 
price which rations the final permit allocation is the participant price. If the 
resource capacities were the only limiting factor in the market (as in the above 
basic model), the participant price equals the zonal price. 
The capacity constraints (P-4) alone would sufficiently model the supply-side 
restrictions if water quality limits for the entire catchment can be stated entirely as 
a set of annual targets for the selected receptors, with no reference to any other 
limit, or allowance for trade-offs between receptors, or periods. Large and hydro-
geologically complex groundwater catchments do not necessarily satisfy all those 
conditions, so the model may need additional environmental constraints. 
Commercial or private constraints such as minimum operating levels may also 
directly affect the demand for permits. We recognize two major types of 
applicable side constraints: receptor-based side constraints; and source-based side 
constraints. 
Price ($)
P fs 1
P fs 2 θ + fs 1 θ + fs 2 
μ fs = P fs 3
θ - fs 4 θ
-
fs 5 
P fs 4
P fs 5
U fs 1 U fs 1+U fs 2 q fs U fs 1+U fs 2+…+U fs 5 Quantity (kg)
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4.1 Receptor-Based Side Constraints 
Nitrate may take many years to travel through large receptors such as lakes. For 
example, it takes 11 years for water to flow through New Zealand’s Lake Taupo 
(Morgenstern 2008). Due to uncertainties in both mixing and residence of nitrate 
in slow moving water bodies such as lakes, and due to the fluctuations in water 
quantity, the environmental authorities cannot rely solely on either a restriction on 
cumulative discharge over many periods, or independent restrictions on the 
discharges in each period. Hence, a workable solution is to impose relatively 
relaxed limits on the effects in each time period, together with a stringent limit on 
cumulative effects (for example, if the nitrate intake capacity and maximum 
nitrate residence time in a lake are roughly given as 40-50 tonnes/year and 5 
years, a restriction of 50 kg nitrate load in each year together with a restriction of 
200=40×5 tonnes aggregate over any 5 consecutive years). Such multi-period 
constraints give more flexibility to the permit users in scheduling their operations. 
The environmental authorities of large catchments may select several connected 
receptors to maintain water quality in the sub-catchments. For example, in a river 
catchment with many sub-catchments draining to different river segments, the 
catchment authority may wish to control nitrate discharge into each segment 
(considered as one receptor) as well as the total discharge into the river (total 
discharge into all receptors). Such cases require multi-receptor constraints to 
control the aggregate effect over several receptors in a single time period. 
We can model all the receptor-end constraints using a receptor-end variable yrt 
defined as the total allocation of resourcert (kg or mg/l). Let i = 1, 2,…, I index the 
receptor-end side constraints (excluding capacity constraints of individual 
receptors); Vi is a restriction on the aggregate effect over multiple receptors or 
multiple time periods as specified by constraint i (kg or mg/l); and Arti
0),min(
),1max( )(
=−∑ ∑ −= − rtzszonef
St
Tts stzr
yqH
 is a unitless 
constraint coefficient. Then the set of receptor-end environmental constraints can 
be written as follows. 
 for all r and t.    (P-7) γ
y
rt 
rt ≤ Crt   for all r and t.    (P-8) λ
∑
rt 
r∑tArtiyrt ≤ Vi   for all i.    (P-9)
 δi 
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Adding a new variable yrt to the primal would add a new constraint to the dual 
and change the dual constraint associated with primal variable qzonezs
−β
 (D-4) as 
follows. 
zs ∑ ∑ += −r rt
Ts
st stzr
H γ)( + = 0  for all z and s.   (D-5) q
zone
−γ
zs 
rt + λrt + ∑iArtiδi = 0 for all r and t.     (D-6)
 y
The dual variable γ
rt 
rt associated with the primal constraint which defines yrt (P-7) 
indicates that the farms would make an incremental profit of γrt if they were 
allowed to increase the nitrate level at receptor r in year t by another one unit. 
Thus they should be charged at γrt per unit increase in nitrate level at receptor r in 
year t. Once more, λrt is the marginal value of the nitrate intake capacity of 
receptor r in year t and hence the market price of resourcert. The capacity owner 
(the regulator if the resource capacities are not fully owned by the farms) should 
be paid at rate λrt. The dual constraint associated with primal variable yrt (D-6) 
describes the relationship between γrt and λrt as γrt = λrt + ∑iArtiδi
The relationship shows that if the receptor-end side constraints are binding, farms 
may have to pay the resource price plus a price for the side constraint. When the 
buyers (farms) are charged at γ
. 
rt and the capacity owners (other than farms) are 
paid at λrt
One way to handle multi-receptor constraints is to define tradable rights for each 
side constraint and let them be traded separately in a combined market. That 
would be analogous to the “flow gate right” approach to electricity market design 
dicussed by Chao et al. (2000).
, the market would clear with surplus revenue, because the same final 
commodity is traded at different prices. The surplus is explained by the amount 
paid by the farms for the binding side constraints. Who should collect the money 
paid for the side constraints? The market requires a mechanism for handling the 
possible surpluses. This is similar to the problem of handling the rental surpluses 
associated with transmission line capacity constraints in electricity markets. The 
issues and alternatives are discussed in Hogan (1992) and Oren et al. (1995). 
  Another option is to define tradable rights in 
terms of locational price differences, as is common in electricity markets, 
following Hogan (1992), and/or inter-temporal price differences, as discussed for 
gas markets by Read et al (2011).  In other cases it may be appropriate to treat the 
constraint as a restriction on the capacity of a service provided to the market by 
someone outside the market. The service need not be explicitly traded among the 
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market participants, but their utilisation of that service is implicit in their trades, 
creating rent implicitly collected via price differences. Then, while the capacity 
owner does not participate in the market, the surplus revenue associated with the 
constraint could be paid to them.7
In the case multi-period constraints, though, defining tradable rights may cause 
confusion, since the rights involved (ie rights to pollute a receptor in each year vs 
rights to pollute a receptor any time within a period of several consecutive years) 
are actually close substitutes for each other. It would seem better to trade only the 
former annual type of rights for early years of the planning horizon, and only the 
latter multi-annual type for later years, where uncertainty is greater. 
 Otherwise, the surpluses may be taken by the 
regional environmental authority to fund remediation projects to clean the 
threatened water bodies, or re-distributed amongst the market participants, e.g., in 
proportion to permit holdings (Raffensperger 2011). 
Multi-period or multi-receptor constraints can significantly affect the resource 
prices charged to the farms. If the nitrate level at receptor r in year t has critical 
impacts on the receptor-end side constraints, farms may have to pay a higher price 
for the resource, even if the associated resource capacity constraint itself is non-
binding. For example, relatively clean sub-catchments performing well below the 
maximum acceptable nitrate discharge into local streams or lakes may still incur 
non-zero prices, because major downstream rivers or lakes are at a critical state, 
with binding environmental constraints. This is a proper reflection of the impact 
that their discharges will eventually have on those downstream receptors. 
Conversely, relatively polluted sub-catchments will have to pay a higher price, 
reflecting local pollution impacts, even though downstream rivers or lakes may 
not be in a critical state. 
4.2 Source-based Side Constraints 
Water quality standards at a few receptors alone may not guarantee local 
groundwater quality. The environmental authorities may impose source-end 
constraints (loading caps) on individual loading rates, regional totals, or 
catchment totals. Zonal loading caps can be used to deal with local hot-spots, 
because managing a loading cap is simpler and easier than having a large number 
                                                 
7 This is similar to the concept of paying the surpluses generated from binding transmission line 
capacity constraints in electricity markets to the transmission network operator. 
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of groundwater receptors. Non-zonal restrictions might also be imposed on total 
permit allocation to farms having some specific characteristic (for example, dairy 
farms or effluent irrigation farms. Hence, side constraints may be imposed on 
zonal loading qzonezs; or directly on combinations of individual allocations qfs
We use two separate indices m = 1,…, M and n = 1, …, N, for these two types of 
source-based constraints. Let W
. 
Z
m and WFn be two restrictions on zonal loading 
and permit allocations respectively (kg), and BZzsm and BFfsn
∑
 be unitless constraint 
coefficients. Then the source-based side constraints can be expressed as below. 
z∑s BZzsmqzonezs ≤ WZm for all m.    (P-10) πZ
∑
m 
f∑s BFfsnqfs ≤ WFn  for all n.    (P-11) πF
In the dual formulation, the prices attached to the (P-10) constraints expressed in 
terms of zonal loading appear as a component of the zonal loading prices, as in β
n 
zs
∑ ∑ += −r rt
Ts
st stzr
H γ)(
 
= + BZzsmπZm, and hence the zonal loading prices reflect the 
market values attached to the restrictions on zonal loading. The prices attached to 
the (P-11) constraints expressed in terms of individual allocations appear as a 
component of the participant prices rather than of the zonal loading prices, as μfs = 
βzs + BFfsnπFn. So, if a constraint n, not directly related to zonal loading, stops a 
farmer from buying more permits up to the point where her marginal profit falls to 
equal the zonal price βzs
If the farms who affect a binding (zonal) source-based constraint face  a price that  
includes a price component associated with that constraint, while other farms face 
a price that does not include the price associated with that constraint, the market 
will clear with surplus revenue. These surpluses can be handled by variations on 
the methods discussed in Section 4.1 for receptor-end side constraints. 
, while the participant price (the farm’s marginal value of 
the next 1 kg) is still above the zonal price. In this case, the zonal price alone 
would not justify the final allocation, in terms of the bid prices. But the zonal 
price, in combination with the shadow price(s) on binding non-zonal constraint(s), 
forms a participant price at which the final allocation is optimal, in terms of the 
bid prices. 
4.3 Private Constraints 
Besides environmental constraints imposed by regulators, farms may have private 
constraints which they cannot easily internalize into their bids. For example, a 
farm may want to have a constant annual quantity for the next ten years; or a farm 
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may be prepared to trade off quantities across years, provided an average is met, 
because some of the fertility from fertilizer applied in one year remains for the 
next. Such inter-temporal constraints are difficult to internalise into bids 
submitted for each year separately. Trial market rounds would help the farms to 
iterate towards a set of bids which meet the additional constraints, but this may 
need a large number of trials. 
Alternatively, these “private” inter-temporal constraints can be included in the 
model as source-based non-zonal constraints on individual allocations as in (P-11) 
above. Such private constraints may provide space for strategic price 
manipulations (Oren and Ross 2004), but such manipulation is equally possible, in 
principle, by manipulating simple offers over multiple market rounds. Conversely, 
private constraints can provide more flexibility to the market, in choosing 
solutions that are feasible and acceptable to permit users, thus avoiding the need 
for many market rounds. Provided the private constraints form a convex LP 
feasible region, the model can still generate efficient market prices for the bids 
submitted. “Participant prices” will then differ by participant, though. 
Farms may also have conditional permit requirements such as “I need at least 50 
kg or none otherwise”, because particular activities will not be economical below 
a certain scale. Participants could express this kind of requirement in their bids.  
But that would create a non-convex (integer) optimization problem, thus 
complicating price interpretation considerably (Bjørndala and Jörnsten 2008). 
Some electricity markets do allow participants to include conditions, such as non-
divisible quantities and start-up costs or restrictions, in their quantity/price bids 
(Contreras et al. 2001). But here we exclude private constraints that require 
integer variables, assuming that farms can internalize those constraints into their 
bids based on past learning, or by iterating through trial market rounds.  
5 Trading Both Resource and Loading Permits 
The LP discussed above is intended to clear a market in which the total available 
capacity Crt for any year and any receptor is in the market. Apart from the 
forecasted availability, the proposed model has no capacity restrictions such as 
reserve requirements. The participants collectively decide whether they allocate 
the total capacity now, or leave some for the future. The prices are determined 
solely by competitive interaction and trading amongst the farms. The total 
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capacity, for the entire planning horizon, is in the market, but the regulator who is 
presumed to “own” any unsold capacity does not actively participate in the 
market. Thus this capacity may be sold for price zero, because the regulator is 
assumed to always have a reserve price of zero. 
Thus, regardless of whether the resource capacities are fully allocated before 
market start, any of the resources may be fully allocated by the market. If a 
resource capacity constraint for some year t becomes binding in the solution, the 
capacity of year t is fully allocated, in terms of year 1 to year S loading permits 
traded in the current auction. Consequently, in the future, farms will not be able to 
buy any loading permit that affects resource utilisation in year t, unless someone 
who has bought a loading permit that affects resource utilisation in year t, offers 
to sell. Another disadvantage of fully allocating future capacities is that the 
estimated capacity Crt
Resource allocation can be balanced over time in several different ways. The 
trivial method is to reserve some specified amount for the future, but authorities 
would have to decide how much. The regulator could set a penalty per unit 
resource allocated beyond some limit, but would have to choose the penalty and 
the limit. More generally, the regulator could set reserve prices on unallocated 
resource capacities, creating what would effectively be a stepped offer function. 
We would hope that the regulator would set reserve prices to price out over-
allocation, not to price out the farms entirely and monopolize the market. Even so, 
such mechanisms push the market further away from free trading. As far as 
possible, we would like to facilitate the market itself to collectively decide how 
much resource capacity to allocate in each year.  
 may not be accurate. If the actual capacity turns out to 
below the estimate, or transport coefficients turn out to be mis-estimated, the 
environmental goals will not be achieved. Therefore, it is always risky to fully 
allocate the estimated capacity. 
The market discussed above traded only farm loading permits. If resource permits 
could also be traded, some entities might buy future capacity in the hope of 
profiting by saving it for the future. The regulator could also trade resource 
permits, as a way of balancing resource use over time. But there are other reasons 
why resource banks would be desirable. Our goal here is to create a market 
environment in which participants can trade interactively in a way which 
improves economic efficiency. Bilateral trading cannot readily achieve this, 
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because discharges at different times and locations are not directly comparable. 
The previously described market in loading permits effectively overcomes this by 
providing a precise mathematical description of the pattern of impacts from each 
source. But it might still turn out that real opportunities for trade are quite limited. 
The ability of the farms to trade future capacities in the market is limited by the 
catchment hydro-geology which determines the composition each farm’s loading 
permit, in terms of ultimate resource capacity impacts. The catchment hydro-
geology is encapsulated in the transport coefficients. Hence, the extent to which 
the farms can really interact via the market partly depends on the extent to which 
their transport coefficient matrices overlap (Prabodanie and Raffensperger 2009). 
Also, the “loading permits” traded by farms each imply a bundle of resource 
permits, in fixed proportions that may differ for each farm. These bundles are thus 
not interchangeable, and it may be quite difficult for the LP to find matching 
patterns that would allow trading to occur. And the delayed impacts of diffuse 
discharges mean that future receptor capacities could easily become fully 
allocated in later years, due to spatio-temporal interactions which farms may not 
readily understand, or be able to trade around. 
While farms alone cannot create an active market, resource banks could create the 
liquidity to make a market work. The LP may not be able to directly match the 
bundles of resource permits implicit in the trades farms want to undertake, but it 
should be able to find resource  banks willing to buy the bundle of resource 
permits implicitly offered by one farm and willing to sell the bundle of resource 
permits implicitly sought by another. Put another way, resource banks should be 
in a position to buy/sell the net discrepancies in year-by-year resource permit 
requirements arising out of the interaction between all farm trades.  
Private parties may buy permits hoping to sell them later, at a profit, or simply 
arbitrage between farm buy/sell bids in the same period, thus improving market 
liquidity, and hence competitiveness, by acting as “market makers”. The 
regulator, or other public spirited parties, may also act as “banks”, to improve 
liquidity, to hold capacity off the market in order to create headroom for future 
trading, or even to retire capacity permanently for the sake of the environment. 
Parties able to clean the receptor water bodies, would also be natural “resource 
bank” participants, selling the tradable capacity they create in the form of year by 
25 
year resource permits. Hence, the expanded market could incentivise active 
cleanup technologies and methods. 
5.2 Optimal Resource Allocation Model (ORAM) 
This section presents a combined market model trading both “loading permits”, 
and trading resource permits. For simplicity, we assume that the farms trade only 
loading permits because the resource permits purchased from the market cannot 
be directly utilized to cover nitrate loading. A farm who wants to trade both 
loading permits and resource permits is considered as participating in the market 
as two independent players: a farm and a bank. We present a model to facilitate 
any number of banks participating in the market. Farms bid for loading permits, as 
above. Banks bid for each resource separately, also using bid steps for quantities 
starting from zero (offers can be converted to gross pool bids as discussed above). 
For this model, we assume that tradable rights (resources) are defined for all 
receptor end constraints in all time periods. We use a common index ŕ = 1, 2, …, 
Ŕ for all the receptor end constraints including receptor capacity constraints, 
multi-receptor constraints, and multi-period constraints. The term resource ŕ refers 
to a tradable right (resource) defined relative to receptor end constraint ŕ. A set of 
additional indices, parameters, and variables are required. 
Additional Indices and Parameters: 
b = bank: 1,…, B. 
l = bank bid tranche: 1,…, L. 
UBankbŕl
P
 = size of bid tranche l submitted by bank b for resource ŕ (kg or mg/l). 
Bank
bŕl
C
= price for bid tranche l submitted by bank b for resource ŕ ($/kg or 
$/mg/l). 
ŕ = tradable capacity of receptor end constraint ŕ (kg or mg/l). Cŕ = Crt or Zi
G
. 
rtŕ = unitless constraint coefficient. Grtŕ = 1, 0, or Brti
Additional Decision variables: 
. 
xbankbŕl = quantity accepted from bid tranche l submitted by bank b for resourceŕ
q
 
(kg or mg/l). 
bank
bŕ = aggregate position of resourceŕ for bank b; this is the size of the resource 
permit held by bank b after trade (kg or mg/l). 
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Model: ORAM 
Maximize ∑f∑s∑k Pfskxfsk, + ∑b∑ŕ∑lPBankbŕlxbŕl
Upper and lower bounds on bid tranches 
, subject to: 
xfsk ≤ Ufsk for all f, s, and k.    (P-1) θ+
x
fsk 
fsk ≥ 0 for all f, s, and k.     (P-2) θ−
x
fsk 
bank
bŕl ≤ UBankbŕl for all b, ŕ, and l.   (P-12) α+
x
bŕl 
bank
bŕl ≥ 0 for all b, ŕ, and l.    (P-13) α−
Calculation of final permit positions 
bŕl 
∑kxfsk − qfs = 0 for all f and s     (P-3)
 μ
∑
fs 
l xbankbŕl − qbankbŕ = 0 for all b and ŕ.    (P-14)
 ν
∑
bŕt 
f∈zqfs − q
zone
zs = 0 for all z and s.    (P-5) β
Receptor end environmental constraints 
zs 
0),min(
),1max( )(
=−∑ ∑ −= − rtzsf
St
Tts stzr
yqH  for all r and t.   (P-7) γ
∑
ŕ 
r∑t Grtŕyrt + ∑b qbankbŕ = Cŕ for all ŕ.        (P-15)
 λ
Source based side constraints 
ŕ 
∑z∑s BZzsmqzonezs ≤ WZm for all m.   (P-10) πZ
∑
m 
f∑s BFfsnqfs ≤ WFn for all n.    (P-11) πF
The dual of the above formulation would show that the market price of resource
n 
ŕ 
λŕ is determined by competition among and between the farms and the banks. The 
dual constraints associated with primal variables xbankbŕl and qbankbŕ produce the 
price relationship λrt = νbŕt = PBankbŕl + α−bŕl − α+bŕl. The relationships indicate that 
a bank can be the marginal trader who determines the market price (λrt = PBankbŕl). 
The market price of resourceŕ cannot be zero unless the banks all bid at price zero, 
or not enough bid for the resource. We could allow the regulator, who offers to 
sell resource permits, to also act as a “Bank”, thus effectively refusing to sell 
unless the market price is above its bid (reservation) price. Hence the farms 
bidding for loading permits have to offer to pay permit prices that imply resource 
prices above the regulator’s reservation price (Hzr(t−s)Pfsk ≥ λrt ≥ PBankbŕl), 
otherwise the farms cannot buy the resource (i.e., the farms who affect the 
particular resource constraint cannot buy loading permits). Thus, even if only one 
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farm’s year-1 to year-S permits affect some year t, the farm’s ability to manipulate 
the price is limited. 
6 A Conceptual LP Model for a Lake Catchment 
This section presents a market model for a hypothetical lake catchment inspired 
by the nitrate pollution problem in the Lake Taupo catchment8. The main purpose 
is to show how the complex market interactions in a large catchment can be 
modeled as an LP, sufficiently addressing the underlying physical transport 
systems while maintaining the simplicity of the model. We do not present a 
numerical simulation of the model9
6.1 Hypothetical Lake Catchment 
, but discuss how the price structure is driven 
by the constraint structure and the ability of the model to generate theoretically 
efficient prices. The model does not correspond to any particular catchment. 
We consider a slow-moving lake with many rivers flowing in and one outlet. We 
assume that nitrogen loss from farms in the catchment occurs as nitrate leaching 
(runoff losses are negligible). Nitrate loaded by the farms may be carried down to 
the lake via streams or direct groundwater seepage. Therefore, the streams and the 
lake are considered as receptors where the mass of nitrate discharge into each 
receptor is to be controlled. We assume that in-stream nitrate residence time is 
less than a year, and the proportions of in-stream nitrate attenuation are known. 
We assume a simple nitrate mass balance model, in which any nitrate ion in the 
lake has a known probability of being lost (due to de-nitrification or other 
processes) and of being drained to the outlet.  
                                                 
8 Since the mid 1970s, increased nitrate levels have been observed in Lake Taupo due to intensive 
farming and urbanization in the catchment. Catchment hydro-geology is complex with 
groundwater nitrate residence times ranging from 20 to 180 years. The lake waters can take 11 
years to travel through the lake to the Waikato River. Even without further intensification of land 
use, the total nitrogen load into the lake is expected to increase in the future (Morgenstern 2008). 
To maintain current water quality, the nitrogen load into the lake has to be reduced by at least 20% 
(Petch et al. 2003). Tradable nitrogen discharge permits have been proposed as a means of 
achieving the target.  
9 Detailed numerical illustrations of the proposed models are available in Prabodanie (2011). 
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All the farms in the catchment are assumed to be participating in the trading 
program as discussed in Section 2.4.1. An independent entity called the “market 
operator” operates the market. A regional environmental authority called the 
“Bank” participates in the market as a resource bank which buys and sells 
resource permits. Trading takes place once every year. At the beginning of every 
trading year, the operator calculates the tradable resource capacities, taking into 
account all non-tradable sources, including the previous year’s discharges. We 
assume no previously allocated permanent discharge rights, and only pre-
purchased permits are considered as initial holdings. A previous market allocation 
cannot cause infeasibility unless the previous capacity estimates were inaccurate 
or some unexpected event occurred (e.g., in this region, a volcanic eruption 
leading to large nitrogen inflows). All initially free (unallocated) resource capacity 
is considered to be owned by the Bank. 
6.2 Market Modeling 
A market model for the catchment requires two types of environmental constraints 
specifying the ability of the receptors to accept nitrates (restrictions on total nitrate 
discharge into the receptors in each year) and the ability of the lake to store 
nitrates (restrictions on annual nitrate storage in the lake) while maintaining its 
health10
Model ORAM presented in Section 5.3 above is the best structure to model a 
market for this hypothetical catchment. We present only the receptor-end 
environmental constraints, because the other constraints and the objective are 
similar to those of ORAM. 
. The trading program would be simpler if tradable resource permits are 
defined only relative to the constraints on annual discharge limits. Surplus 
revenue generated by binding storage constraints can be handled by methods 
discussed in Section 4.1. A cap on loading rate per hectare may be imposed 
(outside the market) to secure local groundwater quality. 
                                                 
10 If the nitrate fate and transport in the lake is well understood with certainty, either type of 
constraints alone may be sufficient to maintain lake water quality. However, under a high level of 
uncertainty, having both types of constraints is safer. Another option is having only the discharge 
based constraints in early years and only the storage based constraints in later years of the planning 
horizon. 
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Additional indices, parameters, and variables: 
Receptor r = 1 is the lake, and r = 2, 3, …, R are the streams. 
ylaket = total mass nitrate discharge into the lake during year t = ∑r Eryrt where 
1−Er = proportion of in-stream nitrate attenuation. E1
y
 = 1. 
store
t
G
 = mass nitrate storage in the lake at the end of year t. 
W
G
= proportion of mass nitrate in the lake that flows into the downstream river 
annually. 
L
y
 = proportion of annual nitrate attenuation in the lake. 
store
t = G (ystore t−1+ ylaket) where G = (1−GW−GL
C
): lake nitrate balance equation, 
assuming both nitrate losses and outflow take place at the end of the year. 
0
Model: LakeModel (Receptor-end environmental constraints) 
 = maximum acceptable mass nitrate storage in the lake. 
∑f ∑s Hfr(t−s)qfs − yrt = 0 for all r and t.   (P`-1) γ
Maximum annual nitrate load into the streams 
rt 
yrt + qbankrt = Crt for all r and t.    (P`-2)  λ
Maximum annual nitrate load into the lake 
rt 
∑r Eryrt − ylaket = 0 for all t.    (P`-3) ε
y
t 
lake
t + qbank1t = C1t for all t.    (P`-4) λ
Maximum in-lake nitrate storage 
1t 
Gylaket/2+ Gystoret−1 − ystoret = 0 for all t.  (P`-5) δ
Y
t 
store
t ≤ S0 for all t.     (P`-6) λ0
6.3 Pricing Nitrate Discharges into a Lake 
t 
The above model contains both multi-period and multi-receptor environmental 
constraints. Hence, the prices should be spatially and temporally dependent. The 
constraint structure of the model provides the following price relationships. 
νrt = λrt
γ
    for all r and t. 
rt = Erεt + λrt
γ
  for r = 2,3, …, R and all t. 
1t = εt
ε
   for all t. 
t = λ1t + Gδt
δ
  for all t. 
t = Gδt+1 + λ0t  
Price λ
for all t. 
rt for some r∈{2,3, …, R} is the market price per unit nitrate discharge 
into stream r in year t. The market price per unit nitrate discharge into the lake in 
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year t is λ1t. The regulator which participates in the market as a bank (possibly as 
a resource owner) will be selling at λrt. However, the prices charged to the farms, 
γrt may be higher than λrt because discharges into the streams have effects on the 
lake also. For the farms, the stream price equals the stream’s market price plus the 
lake price adjusted by the proportion of in-stream nitrate carried down to the lake 
(γrt = Erεt + λrt
The storage cost (cost of carrying a kg of in-lake nitrate into the next year) is δ
). Thus, even if the farms in a sub-catchment perform well below 
the maximum nitrate intake capacity of the local streams, they may face a high 
price because a relatively large proportion of their discharges flow down to the 
lake. The farms may face an even higher price if the local constraints also bind. 
t. 
For discharging nitrate into the lake, the farms should pay the expected cost of 
carrying forward in addition to the market price (ε t = λ1t + Gδt). The storage cost 
of each year is determined by current and future storage capacity constraints (δt = 
Gδt+1 + λ0t
7 Discussion and Conclusions 
). Even if the total discharge into the lake in some year t is well below 
the maximum acceptable level, the price of discharge in year t may be increased 
by the capacity shortages expected in the future. In large agricultural catchments, 
due to unmanaged nitrate discharges in the recent past, capacity shortages are 
more likely to occur in the future than in the present. For example, in the Lake 
Taupo catchment, a large amount of nitrate leached from current and previous 
land use is currently flowing towards the lake via groundwater, and nitrate 
discharge into the lake from this non-tradable source is likely to increase in the 
future (Morgenstern 2008). The above price structure has the capability of pricing 
the current discharges to reflect the value of future capacity. 
We have presented alternative LP models to price diffuse nitrate discharge 
permits. The basic model simulates a market in loading permits where the diffuse 
dischargers, mainly agricultural dischargers, trade rights to load nitrates into 
groundwater aquifers. But we note that restricting the market to only trade 
discharge permits creates rigidities which may make trading difficult. Thus we 
propose an expanded model which allows third parties to trade (unbundled) 
resource permits, together with the loading permits required by farms, in the same 
combined market. We suggest that participation of third parties, including the 
environmental authorities who represent the public interest, as “resource banks” 
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could improve the performance of the market by balancing resource allocation 
over time, establishing competitive market prices, and aiding liquidity.  
This latter model provides a potentially workable approach to the inherently 
difficult problem of creating an environment in which farms can trade 
interactively and adjust nitrate loadings now, while recognizing that the physical 
implications of those adjustments may not be seen for decades hence. This very 
long time scale remains a challenging issue, though, and success probably 
depends on the intervention of far sighted regulators to establish, monitor, and 
probably participate in such markets. Those parties will also have to address 
important practical issues such as the monitoring and enforcement of compliance 
with permit limits allocated by market trading.  
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